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Chapter 9 
The budgetary revolution: from 
near bankruptcy to stability
The transformation of the Community’s budget — 
in scale, in predictability and in the manner in which 
it was agreed — was a vital component in the evo­
lution of the European Community/ Union (EC/
EU) between 1986 and 2000. Indeed it is probably 
fair to say that the Delors I package of 1988 was as 
central a part of the Community’s most productive 
period in the late 1980s and early 1990s as were the 
single market project, the Single European Act and 
the push for economic and monetary union. But 
because of its inherent complexity and technicality, 
the groundbreaking budgetary deal is seldom given 
the attention that it deserves.
The problem
‘The Community is at present faced with a budget­
ary situation which can only be characterised as 
being on the brink of bankruptcy’ (1). The opening 
words of the Commission’s February 1987 review 
of the EC’s budgetary position could hardly have 
been more stark. They were also entirely accurate. 
For nearly a decade the Community had been 
confronted by a growing mismatch between ever 
rising expenditure and static, or even shrinking, 
income  (2). Spending on the common agricultural 
policy (CAP) in particular seemed to increase year 
on year, its scale seemingly impossible for either the 
Commission or the Member States to control. The 
Community’s ‘own resources’ meanwhile  — the 
sums of money that accrued automatically to the 
EC and were intended to be its main source of in­
come — were contracting: the amount brought in 
by agricultural levies shrank as Europe grew more 
self­sufficient in many food products, and  therefore 
(1) COM(87) 101 final, 28 February 1987, ‘Report by the Commission to the 
Council and Parliament on the financing of the Community budget’.
(2) Roy Jenkins told Valéry Giscard d’Estaing this in 1980: Tickell Papers, All 
Souls College Oxford, File  18, ‘Record of a conversation’, 26  November 
1980.
212 The European Commission 1986-2000 — History and memories of an institution
imported less; customs duties declined as tariff 
 levels fell; and the sums raised from value added tax 
(VAT) diminished in real terms as consumer ex­
penditure dropped as a proportion of Community 
gross national product (GNP). The new money re­
leased by the 1984 agreement at the Fontainebleau 
European Council to increase the share of VAT 
handed over to the Community from 1 % of the 
 total to 1.4 % had been wholly used up before 1986 
had come to an end.
This underlying budgetary problem had acutely 
ser ious knock­on effects. To cite the Commission’s 
report once more: ‘the Community has sunk into 
a morass of budgetary malpractices needed to con­
ceal or postpone the real financial implications of 
Community policies’  (1). These included overvalu­
ing agricultural stocks, rolling spending over from 
one year to the next and allowing ‘commitments’ 
(i.e. promises of expenditure in the future) to grow 
out of proportion with the EC’s actual ability to 
pay. Equally seriously, the budgetary shortfalls ag­
gravated pre­existing friction between the three in­
stitutions jointly responsible for agreeing each new 
budget: the Parliament, the Council and the Com­
mission (2). As one internal Commission document 
drawn up in the course of 1987 noted ruefully, 
none of the previous three budgets had been agreed 
within the normal time frame, thereby injecting a 
further element of unpredictability into the Com­
munity’s precarious financial position  (3). The sta­
tus quo was already highly unstable; the prospects 
of coping with the increased expenditure implied 
by enlargement to Spain and Portugal and the costs 
of the new policy priorities identified in the Single 
Euro pean Act were almost non­existent. Change 
was essential.
(1) COM (87) 101 final.
(2) For earlier instances of Parliament–Council friction over the budget see 
Bussière, É., Dujardin, V. et al. (eds), The European Commission 1973-86 — 
History and memories of an institution, Publications Office of the European 
Union, Luxembourg, 2014, p. 246.
(3) HAEU, DORIE 826, SEC(87) 460/1, 3 April 1987, ‘Commission services 
working document on budgetary discipline’.
A radical solution
In taking a new look at Community finances, and 
especially at its ‘own resources’, the European Com­
mission was doing no more than fulfilling the man­
date it had been given as part of the 1984 Fontaine­
bleau deal  (4). But it was typical of Jaques Delors 
to use the opportunity to press for a bold solution 
rather than a minimalist one. The proposal devised 
by the Commission over the course of 1986 and the 
early part of 1987 had four main components. Thus 
the budgetary overhaul envisaged included two 
main aspects: the first was the introduction of a new 
‘fourth resource’ that would automatically make up 
the difference between the budgeted sum and exist­
ing own resources with Member State contributions 
directly linked to their respective GNPs; the sec­
ond was a suggested move to 5­year financial per­
spectives, rather than separately negotiated annual 
budgets. As a quid pro quo for the suggestion that 
Member States should dig deep into their pockets 
to underwrite Community spending, the Commis­
sion for its part proposed a set of steps designed to 
bring expenditure under control, notably a series of 
‘stabilisers’ intended to check the rise in agricultural 
spending (5). Such control of expenditure, especial­
ly when combined with multiannual financial per­
spectives, would bring an element of predictability 
and discipline to Community spending that had 
been lacking hitherto. The fourth component of the 
Commission package was the proposal for a rad­
ical increase in Community spending on Structural 
Funds, designed to help the poorer regions of the 
EC (and especially the newest entrants, i.e. Greece, 
Spain and Portugal) cope with the challenge of the 
single market. The amount of money being direct­
ed to the poorest regions of the Community was to 
more than double between 1988 and 1992 (6). All of 
(4) European Council meeting at Fontainebleau, 25 and 26  June 1984  — 
Conclusions of the presidency: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/me­
dia/20673/1984_june_­_fontainebleau__eng_.pdf
(5) See Chapter 14.1 ‘The common agricultural policy’.
(6) COM(87) 100 final, 15 February 1987, ‘Making a success of the Single Act: 
a new frontier for Europe’.
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this would be underwritten by an interinstitutional 
agreement committing the Parliament, the Council 
and the Commission to the new approach — and in 
the process bringing to an end the bitter interinsti­
tutional infighting that had characterised the years 
since 1979. 
The Commission justified this new approach by 
pointing to the commitments that the Member 
States had entered into with the single market pro­
ject, enlargement and the SEA. ‘In order to succeed 
in its new responsibilities, the Community must 
first complete the reforms it has started, especially 
since 1984, with the aim of adapting its old policies 
to the new conditions: the reform of the CAP to 
take account of new production and trade condi­
tions, the reform of the Structural Funds to make 
of them instruments of economic development, and 
the reform of the financing rules to ensure a budget­
ary discipline as rigorous as that which the Member 
States impose upon themselves’ (1). Delors and the 
three rapporteurs who had drawn up the reform 
programme  — Henning Christophersen, Grigoris 
Varfis and Frans Andriessen — also toured the cap­
itals in early 1987 to sell the budget solution. And 
the Commission President was notably solicitous 
(1) Ibid.
The Heads of State or Government adopted conclusions concerning budgetary discipline and increasing the structural funds 
at the Brussels European Council on 11 and 12 February 1988. 
Family photograph, from left to right, front row: Jacques Santer, Luxembourg Prime Minister; Giovanni Goria, Italian Prime Minister; Poul 
Schlüter, Danish Prime Minister; Margaret Thatcher, UK Prime Minister; François Mitterrand, French President; Jacques Delors, President of 
the European Commission; Helmut Kohl, German Chancellor and acting President of the Council; Wilfried Martens, Belgian Prime Minister; 
Charles Haughey, Irish Prime Minister; Andreas Papandreou, Greek Prime Minister; Felipe González, Spanish Prime Minister. 
Back row: Theódoros Pángalos, Greek Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs; Ruud Lubbers, Dutch Prime Minister; Leo Tindemans, Belgian 
Minister for Foreign Relations; Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs; Geoffrey Howe, UK Secretary of State for Foreign 
and Commonwealth Affairs; Hans-Dietrich Genscher, German Minister for Foreign Affairs; Jacques Chirac, French Prime Minister; Michael 
O’Kennedy, Irish Minister for Agriculture and Food; Jacques Poos, Luxembourg Minister for Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade and Cooperation; 
and Francisco Fernández Ordóñez, Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs.
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in ensuring that the new President of the Euro­
pean Parliament, Lord Henry Plumb, was consult­
ed in advance (1). But despite all of these efforts, so 
far­reaching a package was always likely to be hard 
for the Member States to swallow: the first Euro­
pean Council meeting designed to reach a budget­
ary deal broke up without agreement in December 
1987  (2). It was thus only at a second emergency 
summit, convened in Brussels in February 1988 
 under the presidency of Helmut Kohl, that a deal 
on the new budgetary approach was struck. Cru­
cial to obtaining this outcome was the last­minute 
willingness by Germany to saddle some of the ad­
ditional cost. Important too was the determination 
of the Delors Commission not to allow the package 
to be made less radical, despite the initial failure at 
Copenhagen (3).
The impact
The 1988 budgetary deal provided a stable fi­
nancial platform for the Community’s most suc­
cessful  period of development. No longer would 
the Commission’s ability to act be vulnerable to 
 annual breakdowns in the budgetary process. The 
5­year financial perspective, meanwhile, meant 
that programmes  — especially within the context 
of the Structural Funds — could be planned over a 
meaningful  period of time, rather than being sub­
ject to an nual variations in the amount of money 
avail able  (4). Interinstitutional relations also im­
proved, with the Parliament, the Council and the 
Commission freed from their annual three­way 
(1) HAEC, COM(86), Minutes No 854, second part, meeting of 17 December 
1986.
(2) Financial Times, 7 December 1987.
(3) The Commission’s determination to hold fast was clear from its post­ 
mortem on the Copenhagen failure and its preparations for the Brussels 
meeting. HAEC, COM(87), Minutes No  899, second part, meeting of 
6  December 1987; COM(88), Minutes No  905, second part, 27  January 
1988; COM(88), Minutes No 906, second part, 3 February 1988.
(4) Delors, whose background included a spell at the French Commissariat du 
Plan, was particularly appreciative of this feature: interview with Jacques 
Delors, 16 January 2016.
tug of war over expenditure  — a development of 
great signifi cance at a time when all three institu­
tions had to work well together if they were to stand 
any chance of deliver ing the ambitious legislative 
programme needed to create a functioning intern­
al market by the 1992 deadline. The Community 
was able to increase its expenditure, so as to take 
on additional duties and engage the necessary staff, 
without constantly being held in check by a lack 
of money. In the course of the 1988­1992 period, 
for instance, the  total number of employees at the 
European Commission rose by over 2  000, from 
15 905 to 17 946 (5). And the restraint on agricul­
tural spending paved the way for more far­reaching 
CAP reform in the early 1990s (6). All told it was 
a highly important  — and generally very success­
ful — package of reforms, and as such deserves to 
be seen as one of the key enabling factors behind 
the Community’s surge of progress during the late 
1980s and early 1990s. The only downside, as would 
become apparent at the very end of the century, was 
that the Commission’s internal management pro­
cesses struggled to keep full control of all of the new 
responsibilities and new money with which it had 
been entrusted (7). Few officials had much ground­
ing in management or finance, their background 
more often being law, politics, economics or inter­
national relations. In the boom years that followed, 
though, little heed was paid to such matters.
Needless to say, the move from annual budgets to 
5­year or longer financial perspectives did mean 
that when eventually a new budgetary negotiation 
needed to be held, it was that much more tense and 
fraught because the stakes were that much  higher. 
To make matters worse, 1992, the year when a 
new financial perspective had to be negotiated, 
(5) Figures from ‘Table 6: Staff of the Community institutions from 1968 to 
2000’, European Commission, The Community budget: the facts in figures, 
Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxem­
bourg, 2000, p. 47.
(6) See Chapter 14.1 ‘The common agricultural policy’.
(7) Peter Wilmott emphasised the dismissive attitude displayed by many at 
the Commission to ‘management’: interview with Peter Wilmott, 7 March 
2017.
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 coincided with both a period of economic down­
turn (whereas in 1988 European economies had 
been booming) and a souring of the mood in Brus­
sels, triggered mainly by the difficulties in ratifying 
the Maastricht Treaty. The same Edinburgh Coun­
cil at which a deal on the financial perspective was 
eventually done also had to devise special arrange­
ments to allow the Danish government to consult its 
people once more about the treaty change, the first 
referendum having resulted in a ‘no’ vote  (1). The 
presidency furthermore was held by a UK govern­
ment that was deep in a struggle of its own to get the 
Maastricht Treaty through the House of Commons 
in the face of a determined group of rebels from the 
ruling Conserva tive Party. In addition, with the real 
costs of reunification belatedly becoming apparent, 
Germany was in no mood to repeat the largesse 
(1) Financial Times, 14 December 1992.
that had helped unlock the 1988 deal. Yet despite 
these potentially worrying obstacles a new financial 
perspective was once more agreed, this time due 
to last 7 years,  until 1999, rather than just 5 years. 
A  Delors  II package thus followed Delors  I. Once 
again it promised budgetary discipline in return for 
additional  money being directed towards the poorer 
EU Member States. And, as in 1988, the European 
Council deal committing Member States and the 
Commission was quickly followed by a new inter­
institutional agreement committing the European 
Parliament too. The new budgetary formula had 
worked once more, despite the self­confessed loss 
of momentum and dynamism being experienced by 
Delors, its principal architect (2). 
(2) Interview with Jacques Delors, 16 January 2016.
‘“My dough, my dough!” — “I’m starting to find you quite likeable!”’ 
The cartoonist Plantu depicted the disagreement between the UK Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, and her European partners 
on the budget at the Copenhagen European Council on 4 and 5 December 1987.
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Even more remarkable perhaps was the success­
ful agreement in March 1999 of a new 7­year deal 
cover ing 2000­2007. On this occasion the core 
challenge was that of adapting EU expenditure to 
deal with the imminent arrival of multiple new 
Member States. By the late 1990s it was, after all, 
already clear that a major new enlargement would 
take place, although neither the exact timing nor 
which individual states would join was yet set in 
stone. It was also certain that enlargement would 
not be cheap, since all of the states expected to 
join were likely to be net beneficiaries from the EU 
budget, not net contributors. Thinking through the 
budgetary implications of large­scale enlargement 
was thus at the heart of the Agenda 2000 exercise 
under way within the Santer Commission from 
1996 onwards (1). And agreement on an expensive 
financial framework was never likely to be easy. In 
the event, however, it was made still more problem­
atic by the way in which the final stages of the nego­
tiations over the new financial deal coincided with 
the fall of the Santer Commission. The budgetary 
process appeared to have been robbed of its key in­
stitutional pilot at precisely the most delicate and 
difficult point of the multi annual cycle. Somewhat 
against the odds, however, the 15 Member States 
were able to agree upon a complex, messy, but never­
theless viable compromise at a lengthy European 
Council meeting in Berlin. Of particular note was 
the sizeable sum ‘ring­fenced’ for the benefit of the 
new Member States (2). 
Changing revenue  
and expenditure
With so much being altered in budgetary terms 
 between 1986 and 2000, it is hard to single out the 
most important changes. A few trends do stand out 
(1) Interview with Jim Cloos, 4 July 2016.
(2) Financial Times, 27 March 1999.
however. The first and most basic is the very signifi­
cant increase in the size of the EC/EU budget over 
the 15­year period under review. In 1986 annual ex­
penditure stood at EUR 35 820.2 million; by 1992 
this had risen to EUR 60 844.1 million; and by 2000 
the total was EUR 92 253.6 million — an increase 
over the whole period of 157 % (3). This reflected the 
fact that the EU of 2000 was not just geo graphically 
larger than it had been in 1986 — with 15 Member 
States rather than 12 — but also did much more in 
policy terms, spending significantly higher sums of 
money in the process. Despite this, however, the 
budget remained small both in terms of a percent­
age of EC/EU GNP and when compared to nation­
al public expenditure. The budget represented 0.9 % 
of EC gross domestic product (GDP) in 1986 and 
1.09 % of EU GDP in 2000. And as a percentage 
of total Member State public spending the 1986 
budget was 2.1 %, a figure that had crept up to 2.4 % 
by the start of the 21st century (4). Of the 15 Mem­
ber States, 10 had annual national public expend­
iture amounts that exceeded the annual EU total, 
with only Finland, Portugal, Greece, Ireland and 
Luxembourg spending less (5).
The second important change in the overall num­
bers occurred in the sources of the EC/EU budget. 
In the mid 1980s there were three main sources 
of income: agricultural duties brought in 6.8 % of 
the total, customs duties 24.3 % and VAT 66 %. 
By 1992 the situation was beginning to change 
markedly, with agricultural duties representing 
3.3 %, customs duties 18.9 %, VAT 58 % and the 
new ‘fourth resource’ constituting 13.9 %. And by 
2000 the picture was dramatically altered: agricul­
tural duties only brought in 2.3 % of the total, cus­
toms duties 13 % and VAT 38.1 %, while the fourth 
 resource had become the single biggest source of 
(3) Author’s calculations on the basis of ‘Table 1: Community expenditure 
from 1958 to 2001’, European Commission, The Community budget: the 
facts in figures, pp. 30­31
(4) ‘Table 3: Community expenditure in relation to the total of Member States 
budgets and Community’, ibid., pp. 38­39.
(5) ‘Chart 4: Comparison between public expenditure by the Member States 
and Community expenditure in 2000’, ibid. p. 41.
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 money, contributing 42.3 % of overall income. As 
the 21st century began, the EU was hence primarily 
financed out of the fourth resource introduced in 
1988, with the original two own resources account­
ing for a mere 15 % of the total.
A third major change had occurred in terms of what 
the EC/EU spent its money on. It was true of course 
that spending on agriculture remained the single 
biggest item throughout the period covered by this 
volume. However, as a portion of overall spending 
the CAP steadily declined over the 15 years. In 1986 
expenditure on the European Agricultural Guid­
ance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) constituted 
61.7 % of the budget, dwarfing the second­largest 
category of expenditure, namely the Structural 
Funds at 15.8 % of the total. By 1992 the EAGGF’s 
share of the total had fallen to 51.4 %, with the 
Structural Funds now up to 30.2 % of the budget. 
And by 2000 EAGGF funding accounted for 45 % 
of EU expenditure, with the Structural Funds now 
at 34.6 % (1). The trend towards the dethroning of 
the CAP as the EU’s most expensive policy was un­
mistakeable. Other categories of expenditure that 
had risen significantly included research (2.2 % in 
1986, 3.9 % by 2000), external action (3 % in 1986, 
rising to 6 % of the total in 2000) and administra­
tive costs, which had accounted for 4.3 % of the 
 total in 1986 and stood at 5.1 % by 2000 (2).
Piers Ludlow
(1) ‘Table 2: Community expenditure from 1958 to 2001’, ibid., pp. 35­36.
(2) Ibid.
FIGURE 1
COMMUNITY EXPENDITURE FROM 1958 TO 2001  
AT CURRENT PRICES AND 2000 PRICES
Source: European Commission, The Community budget: the facts in figures, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxem-
bourg, 2000, p. 32.
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